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THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE 
AMERICAN THEORY OF GOVERNMENT: “FIRST 
COME RIGHTS, AND THEN COMES GOVERNMENT” 
RANDY E. BARNETT* 
The topic of this panel is the Declaration of Independence, to 
which I devoted a chapter of my recent book, Our Republican 
Constitution.1 I want to draw on that book to make five points. 
First, the Constitution is not our founding document—the 
Declaration is. In its words, it was “[t]he unanimous Declara-
tion of the thirteen United States of America,”2 in Congress. 
After the founding, the Framers took two cracks at forming a 
national government. We began with the Articles of Confedera-
tion in 1776, before changing to the Constitution in 1789. And 
one might consider the Reconstruction Amendments in 1868 to 
be a third try at forming a government. But the Declaration re-
mained the political fountainhead of them all. 
Second, the Declaration served as a bill of indictment, “sub-
mitted to a candid world.”3 To legally justify armed resistance 
to the crown as something other than treason, it presented a 
“long train of abuses” that the British Crown in Parliament had 
committed against the rights of the people of the United States. 
By this declaration, the colonists “dissolve[d] the political 
bands which have connected them with another,” and “as-
sume[d], among the powers of the earth, the separate and 
equal station to which the Laws of Nature and Nature’s God 
entitle them.”4 In sum, the Declaration was viewed as abolish-
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ing the social contract with Great Britain and establishing a 
state of nature between two independent polities. 
Third, the Declaration then officially identified the political 
theory on which the United States was founded. I stressed “of-
ficially” because this theory was drafted by a committee, edited 
by the Congress as a whole, and unanimously adopted by rep-
resentatives of the thirteen states. And it was only after this of-
ficial act that what the Declaration refers to as the “Form of 
Government” was established, first by the Articles and later by 
the Constitution.5 These constitutional structures were simply 
the means to the ends that were announced in the Declaration. 
Fourth, the end for which these different governments were 
established is described in the Declaration’s two most famous 
sentences, which everyone knows: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are cre-
ated equal; that they are endowed, by their Creator, with 
certain unalienable Rights; that among these are Life, Liber-
ty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.6 
While this passage is familiar, its component parts must be 
separated out. 
(a) “[A]ll men are created equal . . . .”7 This is an affirmation 
of the fundamental equality of each individual person. It 
speaks not of groups, but of individuals. Indeed, as the original 
draft read before it was edited, “all men are created equal and 
independent; that from that equal creation they derive rights in-
herent and inalienable.”8 
(b) The Declaration refers to “certain unalienable Rights.”9 
What does it mean to say a right is inalienable or unalienable? 
It means it cannot be surrendered up to the general govern-
ment.10 In the canonical words of George Mason’s draft of the 
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Virginia Declaration of Rights, which he wrote just weeks be-
fore the Declaration and which Jefferson had before him when 
he wrote the Declaration11: “[a]ll men are born equally free and 
independent and have certain inherent natural rights of which 
they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity.”12 This 
means that such rights are not and cannot be alienated by the 
adoption of a compact or a constitution.13 
(c) Next, “among these are the unalienable rights of Life, Lib-
erty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”14 Once again, this succinct-
ly echoes Mason’s draft Declaration of Rights, which referred 
to “the Enjoyment of Life and Liberty, with the Means of ac-
quiring and possessing Property, and pursuing and obtaining 
Happiness and Safety.”15 Notice that each of these rights be-
longs to the people as individuals. They are not group rights. 
They are not collective rights. They are the individual rights of 
We the People, each and every one. 
(d) We now arrive at what may be the most important sen-
tence identifying the American theory of Government, “[t]hat 
to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”16 
The expressly stated end of government is to “secure” the indi-
vidual natural “rights” named in the preceding sentence. In 
short, governments are instituted among men as a means of 
securing the individual rights of each and every person, and 
the effective protection of these rights is the end against which 
such governments are to be judged.17 Because of the failure of 
the British government to fulfill the political function of secur-
ing the individual rights of each one of us, the Declaration con-
cludes that “these united Colonies are, and of Right ought to 
be, Free and Independent States . . . and that all political con-
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nection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and 
ought to be totally dissolved.”18 
The political theory announced in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence can be summed up in a single sentence: First come 
rights, and then comes government.19 This proposition is not, as 
some would say, a libertarian theory of government.20 The Dec-
laration of Independence shows it to be the officially adopted 
American Theory of Government. 
 According to the American Theory of Government, the 
rights of individuals do not originate with any government 
but pre-exist its formation; 
 According to the American Theory of Government, the 
protection of these rights is both the purpose and first duty of 
government; 
 According to the American Theory of Government, at 
least some of these rights are so fundamental that they are in-
alienable, meaning that they are so intimately connected to 
one’s nature as a human being that they cannot be trans-
ferred to another even if one consents to do so; 
 According to the American Theory of Government, be-
cause these rights are inalienable, even after a government is 
formed, they provide a standard by which its performance is 
measured; in extreme cases, a government’s systemic viola-
tion of these rights or failure to protect them can justify its al-
teration and abolition. In the words of the Declaration, 
“whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
these ends,” that is the securing of these rights, “it is the 
Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and 
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem 
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”21 
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My fifth and final point concerns the passage “deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed.”22 Does this en-
tail that the inalienable rights of We the People, as individuals, 
can be altered or abolished by popularly elected legislators rep-
resenting the consent of the governed? Hardly. 
Representative government is merely one means among sev-
eral to the ends of protecting what the Ninth Amendment re-
fers to as the “rights . . . retained by the people.”23 Neither by 
acts of legislation nor by the Constitution itself may the people 
“divest their posterity”24 of these inalienable rights to “life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness.”25 
According to this passage, governments may exercise not all 
powers, not unlimited powers, but only their “just powers.”26 A 
just power is one that is within the competence of a legitimate 
government, which the Declaration defines as one that secures 
the inalienable natural rights of We the People, each and every 
one.27 
So, the “consent of the governed” is not about popular gov-
ernance by a representative assembly superseding (rather than 
securing) pre-existing individual rights. This passage is about 
which government is to govern the polity that the declaration is 
establishing: the American people.28 Will the American people 
be governed by Crown and Parliament of Great Britain or by 
the governments of the United States? Will it be governed by 
separate state governments, a consolidated national govern-
ment, or some combination of state and national governments? 
It is the matter of “who governs” that the Declaration says is to 
be decided by “the consent of the governed.”29 
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The original public meaning of the text of the Declaration of 
Independence is distinct from the original public meaning of 
the U.S. Constitution.30 The Constitution, however it is properly 
interpreted, does not justify itself. To be legitimate, it must be 
consistent with political principles that are capable of justifying 
it.31 Moreover, these same publicly identified original princi-
ples are needed inform how the original public meaning of the 
Constitution is to be faithfully to be applied when the text of 
the Constitution is not alone specific enough to decide a case or 
controversy.32 
The original principles that the Founders thought underlie 
and justify the Constitution were neither shrouded in mystery 
nor to be found by parsing the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, 
or Machiavelli. 
The American Theory of Government was officially articu-
lated and adopted in the Declaration of Independence. 
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